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Abstract—The majority of smart devices used nowadays (e.g.,
smartphones, laptops, tablets) is capable of both Wi-Fi and
Bluetooth wireless communications. Both network interfaces are
identified by a unique 48-bits MAC address, assigned during the
manufacturing process and unique worldwide. Such addresses,
fundamental for link-layer communications and contained in
every frame transmitted by the device, can be easily collected
through packet sniffing and later used to perform higher level
analysis tasks (user tracking, crowd density estimation, etc.). In
this work we propose a system to pair the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
MAC addresses belonging to a physical unique device, starting
from packets captured through a network of wireless sniffers.
We propose several algorithms to perform such a pairing and we
evaluate their performance through experiments in a controlled
scenario. We show that the proposed algorithms can pair the
MAC addresses with good accuracy. The findings of this paper
may be useful to improve the precision of indoor localization and
crowd density estimation systems and open some questions on
the privacy issues of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth enabled devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of smart mobile devices (smartphones, laptops,
tablets, etc.) used nowadays are equipped with both Wi-Fi
and Bluetooth wireless communication interfaces. The former
type of interface is generally used for internet access, while
the latter is the standard for building wireless personal area
network (WPAN) and exchanging data over short distances
to other devices or communicating with input/output wireless
interfaces (keyboards, headphones, etc.).
Both the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth interfaces are identified by
48-bits addresses, known as the Media Access Control (MAC)
addresses. Such addresses are unique worldwide, and are
embedded into the network hardware during the manufacturing
process, or stored in firmware, and designed not to be modi-
fied. These addresses are fundamental for link layer communi-
cations and are therefore contained in every frame transmitted
by a mobile device on either the Wi-Fi or Bluetooth interface.
Interestingly, there are some management frames which mo-
bile devices transmit on the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth interfaces
even without a proper association with a network and without
any user data to deliver. For what concerns Wi-Fi, probe
requests frames are used to collect information on the network
served by access points in range. As for Bluetooth, inquiry
scan frames are transmitted to discover available devices and
their information. Both kind of frames are transmitted without
encryption, may be easily captured with cheap off-the-shelves
sniffers and a large body of literature has recently studied how
to exploit such information to provide higher layer services.
Indeed, capturing and analyzing wireless packets carrying a
unique device identifier allows to track users in space and
time, forming the basis for passive device localization, user
behavior estimation, market analysis and many others [1].
Although in some devices the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth MAC ad-
dresses are assigned at the same time during the manufacturing
process and are therefore consecutive [2], in the majority of the
cases they are completely unrelated. Therefore, in this work
we present a system capable of pairing a device Wi-Fi MAC
address with its corresponding Bluetooth MAC identifier. We
observe that pairing such two different identifiers, linking them
to a single physical device may be used in several situations:
• In localization systems, a device can be tracked more
precisely by fusing information coming from the two
network interfaces [3], or switching between the two
depending on the availability. The same applies to pedes-
trian flow estimation [4], [5] or crowd density estimation
systems [6], [7].
• Due to the large spread of Wi-Fi sniffers and probe
requests analysis systems [8], [9], device vendors are
recently inserting privacy mechanisms to transmit Wi-
Fi probe requests with a fake, randomized MAC ad-
dress [10]. Since this is not done in Bluetooth, pairing the
same Bluetooth MAC address with multiple randomized
Wi-Fi MAC addresses belonging to the same device
basically cracks this privacy mechanism.
• The mechanism can also be used as an adversary weapon:
a malicious entity can double is effectiveness by commit-
ting blended attacks on both interfaces creating denial of
services (DoS) attacks, battery drain attacks or exploit-
ing other vulnerabilities. As an example, Moyers et al.
[11] demonstrate that such attacks can accelerate battery
depletion by as much as 18.5%.
The proposed system is composed of a network of cheap
sniffers in charge of capturing packets, a python script that
elaborates the data and different pairing algorithms which
exploit the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of the
captured packets to link the two addresses. The rest of this
paper is organized as it follows: Section II presents the
reference scenario and the pairing algorithms; experiments
are shown in Section III, while Section IV concludes theISBN 978-3-903176-05-8 c© 2018 IFIP
manuscript and comments on ongoing and future work.
II. SCENARIO
The proposed system leverages a network of N synchro-
nized sniffers deployed at fixed and known locations in the
environment, equipped with both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth wireless
interfaces and able to capture packets transmitted with both
technologies. Assume M Wi-Fi and Bluetooth enabled mobile
devices are present in the environment. For each packet
transmitted by the m-th device on any interface and captured
by the n-th sniffer, two pieces of information are extracted
and stored in a local database: the Wi-Fi (wm) or Bluetooth
(bm) address of the transmitting device, and the RSSI rm (sm)
associated with the captured packet on the Wi-Fi (Bluetooth)
interface. The system is operated according to discrete time
slots: at the end of each slot, the local information from the
N sniffers are periodically transmitted to a central controller,
which constructs two M ×N matrices R and S where each
element rm,n (sm,n) contains the average RSSI measurement
of the overall Wi-Fi (Bluetooth) packets transmitted by device
m and received by the n-th sniffer. Note that each row of R
(S) corresponds to a different Wi-Fi (Bluetooth) MAC address
wm (bm). In the following, we present different algorithms
for pairing each wm with the corresponding bm, starting only
from the knowledge of matrices R and S. Two different
types of methods are presented: signal mapping algorithms
and location-based algorithms.
A. Signal mapping algorithms
This first class of algorithms maps directly one matrix into
the other and performs address pairing according to signal
similarity.
1) RSSI normalization: The RSS indicator depends primar-
ily on the transmitter-receiver distance and on the transmitter
output power. In our scenario, the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth inter-
faces of a mobile device are colocated (hence the transmitter-
receiver distances are the same), but the output power of
the two interfaces may be different. A possible method to
remove such difference is to normalize each row of R and S
to its maximum RSSI value, so that it contains only values
between 0 and 1. After normalization, rows of R and S can
be compared through standard distance metrics (e.g. Euclidean
distance, cosine similarity) for finding the best-matching pair.
This algorithm is very simple and cheap to execute, and does
not require any training.
2) RSSI-to-distance: A more complex approach consists in
converting both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth RSS measurements in
physical distances. Once converted to distance measurements,
the rows of two matrices can be compared. In this work, the
well known log-distance path loss model is used to convert a
RSSI measurement s into a distance measurement d, that is:
r = r0 − α log d
d0
(1)
where r0 is the RSSI measured at d0 meters and α is the path
loss exponent. In this work, r0 and α are estimated a priori
for each interface (Wi-Fi or Bluetooth) and independently for
several device manufacturers using training data. In details,
each transmitter device is located at known distances from a
sniffer and RSSI data is collected. The log-distance path loss
model is then estimated used least square fitting, as shown in
Figure 1(a) and (b).
3) RSSI-to-RSSI: Another option to perform signal map-
ping is to learn a transformation from one domain to the other.
Assuming again that Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals propagate
according to the log-distance path-loss model, we have:
r = r0 − α log d
d0
(2)
s = s0 − β log d
d0
, (3)
where r0, s0 and α, β capture the difference output powers and
the path loss exponents of the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth interfaces,
respectively. After some algebra, it is easy to show that:





s = θ0 + θ1s (4)
The last equation (4) shows that there exists a linear trans-
formation between Wi-Fi and Bluetooth measurements cor-
responding to the same device. Therefore, we first learn the
linear coefficients θ0 and θ1 for each device manufacturer
using training data (see Figure 1(c)), and we use them to
transform one matrix measurements into the other. Finally,
the rows of the two matrices can be compared using standard
distance metrics.
B. Location-based algorithms
The second class of algorithms performs first a localization
process, in which each address is assigned to a position in a
2D coordinate system. Address pairing is then performed by
linking to each Wi-Fi address its closest Bluetooth address in
space.
1) Trilateration: This method builds on the RSSI-to-
distance algorithm presented in Section II-A2, further pro-
cessing the estimated distance measurements to obtain a 2D
location for each captured device. First, each row of the Wi-
Fi measurement matrix R is converted into distance measure-
ments using the log-distance path loss models learned for each
device manufacturer. Each row of the resulting distance matrix
is composed of measurements dm,n capturing the distance
from the m-th device to the n-th sniffer, whose 2D coordinates
are xn. Localization can be performed solving a trilateration





(‖xm − xn‖2 − dm,n)2 ∀m, (5)
using the gradient descent method. The process is repeated
starting from the Bluetooth measurement matrix S. Finally,
address pairing is performed comparing the estimated loca-
tions.





















(a) Wi-Fi RSSI vs distance























(b) Bluetooth RSSI vs distance






















(c) Bluetooth RSSI vs Wi-Fi RSSI




















Fig. 2. Planimetry of the experimental environment. In green the six sniffers,
in red the fifteen devices positions. The center of each cell, whose area is
approximately one square meter, is used as reference point for training the
Fingerprint algorithm.
2) Fingerprint: The fingerprint method consists of two
phases. In a first off-line phase, the system is calibrated by
sampling uniformly the environment at p spatial positions. A
test device is placed at each position xp, and two fingerprinting
databases are constructed by collecting the Wi-Fi and Blue-
tooth RSSI measurements received at the sniffers, along with
a label indicating the test position. In the on-line phase, upon
receiving the RSSI measurements from the sniffer, k-nearest
neighbor search is used to retrieve the k closest entries (in
signal space) and the corresponding labels. The final location
xm is retrieved computing a weighed average of the k closest
position labels. Weights are chosen to be inversely proportional
to the distance (in signal space) between the input fingerprint
and the k closest in the database.
III. EXPERIMENTS
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed algo-
rithms we carried out an experiment in a controlled scenario.
Six sniffer devices are deployed in an indoor environment
of approximately 50 square meters, as reported in Figure 2.
Each sniffer is built on top of a Raspberry Pi 3 model B
board, equipped with Wi-Fi and Bluetooth communication
capabilities. The OS running on the machines is Raspbian
Jessy version 4.9.24. The system is synchronized using NTP
servers and it is remotely controlled through ClusterSSH over
the Wi-Fi network. This facilitated the experimenter to have
complete control over the whole system remotely. Each sniffer
runs a Python script implementing a simple multi-thread
architecture with two processes that respectively manage the
Wi-Fi and the Bluetooth interfaces. The Wi-Fi sniffing process
is handled by Airodump-ng, a Linux network utility used for
packet capturing of raw 802.11 frames. The Bluetooth inquiry
scanning is done in parallel by hcitool spinq and hcidump,
provided by BlueZ, the Linux Bluetooth stack. The software
is in charge to run the process, parse the data and upload it
on a local MySQL database.
As for the mobile devices, we consider five different mobile
devices: Samsung Galaxy S3 mini with CyanogenMode 12
(based on Android Lollipop 5.1.1), LG E450 with Android
KitKat 4.1.2, Samsung S Advance with Android KitKat 4.4.2,
iPad with iOS 10, and Samsung Galaxy Tab S2 with Android
Nougat 7.0. The devices are placed randomly and their posi-
tions are changed three times to simulate 15 different positions.
All the devices are connected to the same Wi-Fi network,
the screens are always active and the Bluetooth interfaces
visible. Data is collected for exactly 10 minutes for each
device, capturing approximately a Wi-Fi (Bluetooth) packet
every second for each device. Such data is used to build the
two matrices R and S.
The two matrices are processed with the algorithms pre-
sented in Section II. Each row of matrix R, corresponding
to the Wi-Fi address wm is compared to all rows of matrix
S according to each algorithm logic. Bluetooth addresses
bm are then sorted in ascending order of similarity using
Euclidean distance. A top-k approach is then used to perform
algorithms evaluation: for each Wi-Fi address wm, we check
if the ground-truth corresponding address bm is in the first
k positions of the ordered list of Bluetooth addresses. We
















Fig. 4. Top-k {1,3,5} accuracy of the RSSI-to-distance algorithm using
different sniffers configuration.















Fig. 3. Algorithms top-k accuracy. A1 - RSSI Normalization; A2 - RSSI-
to-distance; A3 - RSSI-to-RSSI; B1 - Trilateration; B2 - Fingerprint. The
percentage indicates the number of correctly paired addresses over the number
of tested devices.
then evaluate top-k accuracy as the percentage of correctly
paired addresses over all tested devices. Such an approach
of measuring accuracy reflects particularly those scenarios in
which the user is interested in obtaining a list of possible
pairing devices rather than just one (e.g., an attacker who
wants to direct its attack on a subset of Bluetooth interfaces
possible matching a specific Wi-Fi address).
Figure 3 reports the top-k accuracy of all algorithms,
when k is set to be in the range {1,3,5}. As one can see,
all algorithms exceed 80% top-5 accuracy and 60% top-3
accuracy. The RSSI-to-distance algorithm performs best in all
cases. It reaches 100% top 5 accuracy and 87% top 3-accuracy.
We also analyze the accuracy of the best algorithm (RSSI-to-
distance) when changing the number of deployed sniffers N
from 2 to 6. This corresponds to increasing the sniffer density
from approximately 1 sniffer every 25 square meters up to
1 sniffer every 8 square meters. For a particular number of






possible combinations of the 6 sniffers
shown in Figure 2. As one can see from Figure 4 the number of
sniffer devices used impacts on the accuracy of pairing almost
linearly. However, with only 2 sniffers the top-5 accuracy of
the RSSI-to-distance its still around 80%.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the possibility of pairing
a Wi-Fi MAC address and a Bluetooth MAC address of a
mobile device in a controlled environment. First, we have
presented the sniffers hardware and software architecture.
Then, we have described different address pairing algorithms
based on two different methodological approaches. The pro-
posed system was tested in a controlled environment achieving
promising results. As a future research direction, we plan
to (i) validate the results in a real scenario, also dealing
with non-static devices, (ii) investigate machine-learning based
methods, including other features different from the RSS to
perform pairing (e.g., the Bluetooth/Wi-Fi Round Trip Time
or the MAC addresses themselves) and (iii) evaluate the
performance increase of the pairing algorithms when applied
as preprocessing step in localization and crowd estimation
systems, or when applied with malicious intentions to attack
a device identity or a device battery.
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